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Executive Summary 
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
stands out from other UN peacekeeping missions, as these have fo-
cused on responding to situations of violent conflict. In Haiti there is 
no violent conflict as such: the problems are lack of political coming 
together, lack of respect for agreements, and lack of capacity to com-
promise. In contrast to the loud national-level narrative extremely crit-
ical of MINUSTAH, at local levels the UN mission has often been the 
only available link to the national government and international organ-
izations present in remote areas.  
 
This report is part of a comparative study of UN local peacebuilding 
in three countries – Haiti, Liberia and South Sudan. When initiating 
this study, the research team chose the Civil Affairs (CA) section of 
UN peacekeeping operations as an entry point, based on the experi-
ence that this section is usually deployed wherever the peacekeeping 
mission has established presences, and is tasked among other things 
with, inter alia, acting as the intermediary with local authorities and 
populations, as well as the rest of the UN peacekeeping mission and 
other UN actors.  
 
MINUSTAH has over 100 Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs) deployed 
across Haiti’s ten departments, working on a daily basis with national, 
departmental and local-level officials. Through the Civil Affairs Sec-
tion, MINUSTAH has a reach throughout Haiti impossible to match 
by any UN agency or NGO. In the words of one CAO, it ‘can feel the 
temperature on the ground’.1 This proximity has led to privileged rela-
tions and trust with local authorities, enabling civil affairs to voice the 
needs and concerns of local officials to central authorities. Local au-
thorities we spoke with – from all levels – were aware of the role of 
civil affairs, and could distinguish between different MINUSTAH sec-
tions and identify their civil affairs focal points.  
 
There are obvious advantages in the fact that over 90% of the senior 
CA staff have over five years within MINUSTAH, thereby providing 
the mission with considerable contextual knowledge and institutional 
memory. On the other hand, this also results in a static staffing struc-
ture, with the danger of settling into routines rather than responding to 
changing needs and demands on the ground. Although Civil Affairs 
have successful experiences in bringing together non-state actors, as in 
                                                 
1  Interview with civil affairs officer (CAO). 
12 Diana Felix da Costa and John Karlsrud 
the ‘town hall meetings’ during Haitian presidential elections, the sec-
tion recognized that its support had focused mainly on local authori-
ties, and that it was necessary to extend this support to the various 
non-state actors so important to the social fabric of the country. State 
coverage is minimal, with most of Haiti’s governance and rule of law 
institutions either totally absent or inefficient, leaving the responsibil-
ity for public service delivery largely to non-state actors, INGOs and 
businesses.2 In the future, these non-state actors must be taken more 
seriously by MINUSTAH in the institutional building framework. 
 
With the extensive presence that MINUSTAH has established in Haiti, 
there also follows a promise of leaving something tangible behind. 
MINUSTAH has been undertaking a large number of quick impact 
projects (QIPs) – refurbishing and building offices for municipality 
officers, courts, marketplaces and so forth. Technical assistance to im-
plement QIPs has become a central element in the work of CAOs in 
Haiti, due to the time-consuming element and visibility of such pro-
jects. When we spoke with CAOs, they counted their achievements in 
terms of buildings, infrastructure, establishing archives or even or-
ganigrammes almost as frequently as did the local authorities. 
 
While these results of QIPs are important features for the effective 
functioning of local authorities, they do not indicate how the local au-
thorities are actually performing in their key role: of delivering basic 
services to local populations. The focus on material support through 
QIPs may be only a bias from the limited number of respondents or 
due to the limited time that the research team spent on the ground, but 
it should still give some pause for thought. In the aftermath of the 
crippling earthquake, MINUSTAH has focused on QIPs as a means to 
provide tangible support, expanding the budget for QIPs from about 
$3 million to the current $7.5 million per year for QIPs. In addition, 
the mission has other resources that can be used for support – in total 
around $3 million, as well as various mission assets that to some de-
gree can be used for mutually beneficial purposes, like repairing roads 
that are critical for the mission.  
 
CAOs often underscored that their presence throughout the country 
enables them to feel the pulse of the country. While this is true, we 
also think that they may underestimate the expectations that their 
presence may raise among local populations. The breadth of the UN 
presence is impressive, but the scope and depth of their activities is 
less so. The focus on QIPs absorbs much valuable staff time with lim-
ited returns. It is understandable that officers want to leave some tan-
gible structures behind, but these should be coupled with more long-
                                                 
2  See e.g. World Bank (2006), Haiti Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti: A Coun-
try Social Analysis, 27 April 2006. 
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term activities that could ensure a sustainable approach that couples 
tangible structures with capacity development.  
 
The UN is working diligently to improve the lives of Haitians, but 
these efforts have encountered significant challenges as regards coor-
dination and cooperation with the rest of the UN system and other de-
velopment actors. The UN mission has moved the CA section from 
the political to the development pillar, to ensure that the work of civil 
affairs and the commensurate outputs are in line with the longer-term 
peacebuilding and development objectives of Haiti. As yet, however, 
this administrative reshuffling has not had tangible results in terms of 
improved cooperation between civil affairs and other UN funds, pro-
grammes and agencies. This is a challenge not only of coordination, 
but also of leveraging the presence of CA and UN mission assets 
throughout Haiti to realize substantial and tangible peacebuilding and 
development dividends that can benefit local populations. 
MINUSTAH has met significant challenges in this area that must be 
overcome if it is to continue to prove relevant to Haitian stakeholders, 
on the national as well as the local levels.  
Summary of recommendations 
1. Institutional support and supporting participation in  
national policy processes 
 Member states, MINUSTAH and other actors should continue 
to press for legal reforms for establishing a viable framework 
for support to decentralization and local government, institu-
tionalizing and securing the progress made so far  
 Notwithstanding the absence of a legal framework, 
MINUSTAH and the rest of the UN system should continue 
their important work in capacity development for local gov-
ernment officials along the lines of the training offered to mu-
nicipal accountants 
 Future legal reform will need to tackle, inter alia, the difficult 
issue of possible duplicative structures on local levels. 
2. QIPs and programme activities    
 MINUSTAH should, with reference to the policy directive on 
QIPs and the Secretary-General’s report on civilian capacities, 
consider using more funds for capacity development activities 
for local officials, in close collaboration with the Ministry of 
Interior and Territorial Collectivities, civil society, UNDP and 
other relevant stakeholders 
 QIPs are very time-consuming, so there should be a focus on 
pooling similar QIPs in order to lower the transaction costs 
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 Staff should be trained in development programming, and a 
closer partnership with UNDP and other development agencies 
should be fostered, especially since these actors are currently 
co-located in PaP. 
3. Local ownership and engaging with non-state actors    
 While civil affairs (CA) is recognized by local authorities as 
the ‘best in class’ in terms of listening to local needs, it is im-
portant to strengthen the participatory approach further, e.g. 
through town hall meetings to ensuring that other voices also 
are heard and able to participate in national decision-making 
processes 
 Having a core mandate of feeding local voices into national 
policy processes, CA should make a more sustained effort in 
engaging with and strengthening the capacity of a broader rep-
resentation of local actors, including various civil society or-
ganizations and churches; 
 Recalling the g7+ declaration, there is a need to pay more at-
tention to national planning frameworks and needs, on the na-
tional, departmental and local levels, for instance by support-
ing the table de concertation and the rule-of-law clusters as 
decision-making forums for all peacebuilding and develop-
ment actors.    
4. The UN and local level peacebuilding 
 The CA workload should be trimmed, e.g. through limiting the 
use of QIPs;  
 The UN should consider the model of South Sudan– of includ-
ing posts with responsibility for programme activities and 
opening the field presences for other peacebuilding and devel-
opment actors  
 Strengthen planning for early peacebuilding among relevant 
staff in MINUSTAH, including CA through a joint planning 
exercise with the UN country team  
 Operationalize existing integration in planning frameworks 
such as the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) into pro-
gramme activities executed on the local level  
 Consider a 24-month transition window in the handover of 
programme activities from MINUSTAH to the UN country 
team  
 Pool resources for programme activities by focusing QIPs on 
essential tasks and transferring funds to capacity-development 
initiatives that can be initiated with reference to the SG guid-
ance on civilian capacities 
 Devise a strategy together with UN DPKO New York on how 
to achieve staff mobility on senior levels. 
MINUSTAH is a state within a state3 
 
This mission can come to support us, but the decisions have to be tak-
en by Haitians. We are the ones that know the context best. In some 
cases, the mission replaces Haitians. When this is done, it always re-
presents problems.4 
 
 
Introduction  
Recent years have seen growing attention in policy and academic cir-
cles to the work the United Nations is doing on the local level in 
peacebuilding operations.
5
 It has become increasingly clear that the 
success of early peacebuilding activities depends on achieving locally 
owned and contextualized solutions through listening to local needs 
and understanding political dynamics. There is also an increasing con-
sensus that the peacekeeping/peacebuilding nexus is an artificial di-
vide: in reality, civilian peacekeepers can be considered early peace-
builders.6 The question is whether – and how – they can perform a 
catalytic and enabling role to facilitate development activities of other 
                                                 
3  Informal discussion with national CAO. 
4  Interview with a mayor in the South Department. 
5  This project focuses on early peacebuilding activities within peacekeeping operations, as 
defined by the UN Secretary-General in his opening remarks of the Security Council dis-
cussion on peacebuilding, 13 October 2010, where he stressed that peacekeeping missions 
should be enabled ‘to have an impact as “early peacebuilders”’. See UN (2010), ‘As Secu-
rity Council Weighs Measures to Strengthen Peacebuilding, Secretary-General Stresses 
Rapid Deployment of Trained Staff, Predictable Financing, Women's Input’, Press Re-
lease [Online]. Available at:  
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sgsm13181.doc.htm [Accessed 28 October. In 
line with the above statement, this report uses the term ‘peacebuilders’ to refer to the ci-
vilian staff who work in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations with tasks intended 
to reduce the fragility of states ravaged by conflict and strengthen their resilience against a 
relapse into conflict. The meeting in the Security Council was held to discuss the latest 
progress report on peacebuilding: UN (2010), ‘Progress report of the Secretary-General 
on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict’, UN Doc. S/2010/386, published 
16 July 2010 [Online]. Available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep10.htm, accessed 15 
July 2011.  For policy documents on the role of UN DPKO on the local level, see e.g. 
United Nations (2008), United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guide-
lines, (‘The Capstone Doctrine’) DPKO, United Nations, New York. Available at: 
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.p
df; United Nations DPKO (2008), Policy Directive: Civil Affairs, Department of Peace-
keeping Operations; and Department of Field Support. Available on: 
http://www.undg.org/docs/8915/Civil-Affairs-Policy.pdf. For some academic literature 
see e.g. Stathis N. Kalyvas, (2006), The logic of violence in civil war, Cambridge Studies 
in Comparative Politics Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; S. Autessere, (2010) 
The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuild-
ing. Barnard College, Columbia University, New York. 
6  See the ACCORD publication Conflict Trends 3/2011 (September 2011) dedicated exclu-
sively to the ‘peacebuilding-peacekeeping nexus’. Available at: 
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/ct/ct_2011_3.pdf.  
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actors, UN and others, so as to create peace dividends from their pres-
ence.  
 
Activities of the government and UN peacebuilders aim to instil con-
fidence in the peace process at the local level, through strengthening 
local authorities and improving service delivery, facilitating reconcili-
ation processes, and coordinating support from other UN agencies and 
international actors. In this work, civil affairs officers (CAOs) of the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have a particu-
larly important role. The rationale for making the connection between 
civil affairs and local-level peacebuilding builds on the evolving un-
derstanding that ‘peacekeepers are peacebuilders’ and should imple-
ment early peacebuilding tasks.  In peacekeeping missions, the Civil 
Affairs section is most frequently deployed throughout the host coun-
try and provides the UN with a presence on the local level. This pro-
ject examines how Civil Affairs in three missions have operational-
ized and implemented their mandates, through field research in Haiti 
(United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti – MINUSTAH), Libe-
ria (United Nations Mission in Liberia – UNMIL) and South Sudan – 
(United Nations Mission in South Sudan – UNMISS). Further, it stud-
ies how the UN peacekeeping more broadly is organizing its work on 
the local level and working together with local authorities, other UN 
agencies and development actors.  
 
The research took a real-time learning approach through interactive 
discussions with CAOs and staff from other substantive sections of 
peacekeeping operations. One of the overall goals of the project is to 
support and contextualize peacekeeping practices and processes in 
South Sudan, Haiti and Liberia, offering an alternative and external 
view. The research project has resulted in field reports for each coun-
try that aim to feed into the knowledge production for DPKO Peace-
keeping Best Practices Section/Civil Affairs, UNDP, the Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other interested stakeholders.  
Structure of the report and guiding questions 
Following a brief overview of the country context and history of UN 
peacekeeping in Haiti, the report introduces UN civil affairs in Haiti, 
briefly explaining the  overall roles, responsibilities and challenges. 
The report seeks to elucidate some core research questions developed 
by NUPI:  
 
 What kind of mechanisms has been used to feed the voices of lo-
cal institutional and non-institutional actors into political process-
es? 
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 Are local institutional and non-institutional actors able to influ-
ence national decision-making processes, and if so, how? 
 How are the needs for service provision and political participation 
captured on the local level, and how do these needs feed into de-
cision-making processes? 
 Are civil affairs officers promoting local ownership and effective 
participation of all stakeholders in decision-making processes, 
and if so, how?  
 How can civil affairs officers contribute to the strengthening of 
confidence of the local population in local authorities, and the 
support given by the UN and other international actors? 
 How does the cross-mission representation role of civil affairs fa-
cilitate implementation and/or transition etc? 
Methodology 
Haiti was chosen as a case study for the project because it is unique 
within UN peacekeeping operations. In Haiti there has been no open 
conflict between warring factions. Yet the long-term political crisis in 
Haiti and consequent social, economic and security crises and natural 
disasters have left the country in a state of chronic emergency, with 
levels of criminality that have repeatedly threatened to plunge the 
country into further instability. The relative absence of state structures 
throughout the country, and their inability to deliver basic services and 
security to the population, have justified the presence of MINUSTAH, 
along with a great many non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Many of the persons we interviewed questioned the use of the term 
‘peacebuilding’ in a context like that of Haiti, where there has not 
been open war or conflict. We recognize this and use the term loosely 
in such a way that it can be applied to all three case studies. The report 
broadly understands ‘peacebuilding’ as efforts ‘to identify and support 
structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to 
avoid a relapse into conflict’.7 
 
The research in Haiti consisted of four weeks of fieldwork, between 
28 August and 24 September 2011. The first week was spent in the 
capital city, Port-au-Prince (PaP) at headquarters level, interviewing 
civil affairs senior leadership, the Parliament Support Unit (PSU), and 
some CAOs working in the West region where PaP is located, fol-
lowed by two one-week visits to two departments – the South De-
partment and the North Department, with a short two-day visit to the 
North-East Department as well. The team had therefore the opportuni-
ty to visit four departments out of a total of ten. During the field visits, 
the team learnt about how CA has been implementing its diverse 
                                                 
7  Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace’, UN document A/47/277-S/24111 (17 
June 1992).  
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mandate, including institutional support, management of QIPs and 
border management. This allowed for a fairly comprehensive under-
standing of civil affairs work at headquarters and field offices, in its 
specific adaptation to local circumstances, as well as in its general ap-
proach to implement its mandate in cooperation with other UN agen-
cies, with national authorities on the local, departmental and national  
levels, and with international development actors.  
 
The research team was hosted and supported by MINUSTAH’s civil 
affairs section, receiving invaluable administrative and logistical sup-
port of CAOs at all field offices visited. The team consisted of Diana 
Felix da Costa, John Karlsrud and Gabrielle Hyacinthe, in addition to 
Bernady Hyacinthe, who participated in the field research in the South 
Department. Gabrielle Hyacinthe had served as a CAO for five years 
and brought to the team not only her valuable insights, but also an ar-
ray of contacts and network with local authorities and civil affairs 
staff. 
 
The methods and tools used for the field research were anthropologi-
cal and qualitative. In addition to participant observation and partici-
pation in CA events (which included accompanying CAOs during 
several field visits), semi-structured interviews and informal discus-
sions were conducted with CAOs, staff from other MINUSTAH sec-
tions, UNDP staff, national and local authorities, and civil society or-
ganizations. The project took a real-time learning approach through 
interactive sessions with civil affairs and planning staff of peacekeep-
ing operations, UNDP and other members of the UN Country Teams. 
Focus-group discussions were also conducted with members of the 
general population. In total, the research team conducted 55 inter-
views with 59 interviewees and had eight focus-group meetings with 
34 respondents.8 Prior to leaving Haiti, the research team held a feed-
back session with the head of Civil Affairs and some of the staff in 
PaP. Preliminary findings were shared and validated.      
                                                 
8  According to project reference table, last updated on 20 September 2011. 
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Table 1: Interviews conducted in each location, by organizational 
background and gender9 
 
  
Civil Affairs 
staff 
Other 
UNMISS staff 
UN  
Agencies 
Gov.  
Authorities 
Civil 
Society Total 
 Gender M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Total 13 8 4 3 4 2 30 6 9 4 60 23 
 
Two focus-group discussions were conducted with CAOs, and two 
with members of the local population. Interviews were conducted 
mostly in English, occasionally in French, with MINUSTAH staff, 
and in French and Haitian Creole with the local authorities, organiza-
tions and population. We have chosen to keep all interviews as anon-
ymous as possible, indicating only the institutional affiliation, without 
dates or locations.  
Challenges in methodology 
While the study is qualitative and not comprehensive, we hope it can 
offer useful insights and reflections on MINUSTAH’s work in Haiti. 
It is however, not intended to be a comprehensive account of UN 
efforts in local peacebuilding, nor of CA work in Haiti. More time 
would have been needed for a more comprehensive and deeper analy-
sis. The research team was taken to research sites generally selected 
by CA staff, and were seen by most local authorities as part of 
MINUSTAH. 
                                                 
9  This table includes only those interviews formally conducted as interviews, not the many 
background talks and informative exchanges with people from all organizational back-
grounds. However, these more informal exchanges serve to inform the following text as 
much as the formal interviews, and should be as part of the process of participatory ob-
servation and fieldwork.   
Background 
Haiti: a history of political violence and natural disasters 
Haiti has had a turbulent history marked by political violence and nat-
ural disasters. Highly polarized politics have complicated efforts to 
address the country’s complex and deeply rooted development chal-
lenges. The country remains the poorest in the Americas. Due to a 
combination of geography, poverty, social problems and poor building 
standards, it has recently witnessed mudslides, floods, earthquakes 
and hurricanes, all with high human casualties. 
 
Politically, Haiti has suffered 32 coups in its 200 years of post-
colonial existence. A long history of oppression by dictators – includ-
ing both Duvaliers – and external interventions of international pow-
ers such as France and the United States since the country’s founding 
have also had a significant impact in shaping today’s political and so-
cio-economic environment and its sense of identity. In February 2004, 
an armed rebellion forced the resignation and exile of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, and a provisional government took control, with 
security provided by MINUSTAH.10 Michel Martelly, the current 
president, was elected in the general elections of 2011. 
UN peacekeeping in Haiti 
The Mission des Nations Unies au Haiti (MINUSTAH) arrived in Hai-
ti in June 200411 in the midst of the political crisis, social instability 
and widespread violence and insecurity triggered by the Gonaïves re-
volt, which spread to other cities and which led to the abrupt departure 
of President Aristide in February 2004, allegedly after pressure from 
the United States.12 MINUSTAH had an authorized strength of 6700 
military troops, more than 1600 UN police officers, and a mandate 
                                                 
10  For the recent historical background see for example P. Girard (2010) Haiti: The Tumultu-
ous History - From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken Nation, New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lan 
11  See the MINUSTAH website for the background to UN peacekeeping in the country. 
Available on: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/background.shtml, 
accessed 10 January 2012.  
12  ‘…James Foley, the U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, made it clear to Aristide that the United 
States would not protect him and that he was on his own. The U.S. State Department also 
prevented the San Francisco-based firm under contract to provide private security for 
Aristide from sending additional personnel as Aristide had requested.’ A. Dupuy (2010) 
‘From Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Gerard Latortue: The Unending Crisis of Democratiza-
tion in Haiti’, Journal of Latin American Anthropology 10(1), at p. 187.  
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focused on supporting a peaceful and constitutional political process 
and establishing a secure and stable environment.13 
 
Seven years later – and after the tragic earthquake that shook the 
country on 12 January 2010, killing 220,000 and leaving 1,5 million 
people homeless, pushing back many of the achievements since 2004 
– MINUSTAH remains a contentious force in the country. Some see it 
as yet another occupying force that should leave the country. Others 
question the mission’s current structure, with over 12,000 military and 
police troops, and would favour a political mission focused on sub-
stantive civilian components like supporting the strengthening of rule 
of law and justice, and policing units better equipped to respond to the 
political and security challenges facing the country.14 As expressed by 
one respondent: ‘Haiti is not a post-conflict country. In this light, it 
has to be reconsidered what type of tools are appropriate for its situa-
tion. Military and police are not necessarily the right solution for Hai-
ti’s context’.15 
 
Interestingly, MINUSTAH enjoys significantly more support and 
recognition at the local level, particularly among elected local authori-
ties, in contrast to the widespread reluctance seen at the national level. 
The general absence of state authorities throughout the country has 
meant that MINUSTAH is often the only link to the national govern-
ment. One national professional officer (NPO) within civil affairs 
even argued that ‘MINUSTAH is a state within the state’ – a point 
explored later in this report. Haiti stands out from other countries 
where UN peacekeeping missions are deployed:  
 
MINUSTAH is very different from other PKO missions. In Haiti there is no vio-
lent conflict but lack of political coming together; lack of respect for agreements; 
lack of capacity to compromise. (…) We are here to, together with the govern-
ment, create stronger political governance. Civil affairs received a request from 
the Minister of Interior to coach local authorities, working with them through 
budget issues, project management, such as in the cholera response.
16
 
 
We explore this further in the report, starting with a focus on civil af-
fairs (CA) and its tasks, then moving to the larger questions of how 
and if UN peacekeeping officers in Haiti are leveraged to provide 
peacebuilding and governance dividends to the population.   
                                                 
13  On 30 April 2004, acting on the recommendations of the Secretary-General, the UN Secu-
rity Council adopted UN SCR 1542, establishing MINUSTAH.  
14  MINUSTAH ’s overall force levels consist of up to 8940 troops and 4391 UN police 
(UNSCR 1944 (2010).  
15  Interview with former senior-level MINUSTAH staff.  
16  Interview with senior CAO. 
Contextualizing early peacebuilding 
to local circumstances – findings from 
Haiti 
1. Brief introduction to civil affairs in Haiti 
UN civil affairs is one of the largest civilian components in UN 
peacekeeping, with 1009 staff members mandated and 870 staff de-
ployed globally to facilitate the implementation of peacekeeping man-
dates at the subnational level.17 In Haiti, UN civil affairs officers 
(CAOs) are central the core mandate of MINUSTAH. The civil affairs 
section is the largest and most far-reaching civilian component in the 
mission, with over 100 officers spread throughout the country’s ten 
departments. Their presence throughout the territory enables CAOs to 
‘take the pulse’ of the country and the challenges it faces, channelling 
information between national and local authorities, the population at 
large as well as the senior mission management.  
 
Civil affairs has a broad UN mandate in Haiti, ranging from support to 
elections, promoting an all-inclusive political dialogue and national 
reconciliation, building institutional capacity at all levels, and in addi-
tion, coordinating and representing other MINUSTAH sections – like 
child protection, gender, political affairs – in the departments where 
these sections have no presence.18 The core objectives are to strength-
en democratic state institutions at the national and local levels, and to 
strengthen state authority throughout Haiti.19 Six general objectives 
and actions have been established:20 
 
- Support the development of a corps of civil servants and the es-
tablishment of local governments able to organize public ser-
vices across the country; 
- Strengthen decentralised public institutions;21 
                                                 
17  Including professional national and international officers and UN Volunteers. UN 2012. 
Civil Affairs Staffing January 2012. UN DPKO, New York. 
18  See UNSC Resolution 1892 (2009), 1927 (2010) and 1944 (2010). Also team interviews 
with CAO. 
19  MINUSTAH Section: Civil Affairs, Workplan 2010-2011, Amended 28 October 2010 
(Version, 6 September 2010).  
20  Information retrieved and translated from the MINUSTAH website: 
http://minustah.org/?page_id=11022. 
21  For a description of Haiti’s territorial division and the current decentralization process see 
A. Simpson (2011) A study of Local Governance Development in Haiti, upon entering the 
49th Legislature, MA Thesis: University of Birmingham (UK), August 2011.  
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- Support the Government in the development and implementa-
tion of a comprehensive border management strategy; 
- Contribute to the smooth functioning of the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies/Members of Parliament; 
- Increase accountability and participation of civil society in 
public affairs and government; and 
- Promote national dialogue and help solve local conflicts. 
 
In addition, each regional office is responsible for civil representation 
of MINUSTAH and for coordinating the activities of the other 
MINUSTAH components present in the region.  
 
To achieve these objectives, Civil Affairs is divided into four units – 
the Institutional Support Unit, the Quick Impact Projects Unit, the Par-
liament Support Unit, and the Coordination and Reporting Unit. For 
these objectives and tasks, MINUSTAH has staff deployed in Haiti’s 
ten departments, working on a daily basis with national, departmental 
and local-level officials. This proximity has in many instances led to 
strong relations with local authorities. Local authorities we spoke with 
– from all levels – were aware and appreciative of the role of CA, and 
were able to distinguish between the different MINUSTAH sections 
and identify their CA focal points.  
Civil affairs activities at national and local levels 
All four CA units work toward the same goal of strengthening state 
institutions. The two-person Parliament Support Unit provides direct 
technical support to various units of the Parliament and acts as the in-
terface between the Parliament and MINUSTAH. The unit is particu-
larly involved in issues of decentralization and strengthening of the 
public sector. All local authorities interviewed mentioned the current 
centralized state apparatus as one of the main constraints to good gov-
ernance. The Parliament Support Unit is located only in Port-au-
Prince.  
 
The three-person Coordination and Reporting Unit based at 
MINUSTAH’s HQ in PaP is the  central reporting unit of the mission, 
compiling weekly reports that come in from the regions with contribu-
tions from every section. Similarly, the three-person central Quick 
Impact Projects (QIPs) unit based in PaP manages the QIPs at central 
level. Although it is intended to have two QIP focal points in each of 
the field offices,22 this is rarely the case.  
 
While all units are complementary to each other, the most significant 
dimension of CA in Haiti is arguably to be found in its institutional 
support at national and local levels. The Institutional Support Unit has 
                                                 
22  Interview with senior MINUSTAH official. 
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a team in PaP, consisting mostly of NPOs embedded in the Ministry 
of Interior and Territorial Collectivity (MICT). Most of their work is 
done in the various departments of the country, working alongside 
with mayors and other local authorities.  
 
At the local level, CAOs have a range of roles and tasks, not always 
core to their mandate. The head of CA serves as chief of regional of-
fice (CRO) in each field office. Core CA tasks centre on accompany-
ing and strengthening local authorities, feeding local voices into na-
tional policy processes; serving as the eyes and ears of the SRSG and 
the Political Affairs Section on the ground; and planning and imple-
menting QIPs. The CRO is also the focal point for, inter alia, the 
Gender, Best Practices and Conduct and Discipline Unit, ‘chief of the 
fire engine department’ putting out small conflicts in the municipali-
ties at frequent (at least weekly) intervals. The following sections ex-
plore in greater detail the various CA functions undertaken at the local 
level.  
2. Institutional support and supporting participation in  
national political processes 
Civil Affairs in Haiti works to promote institutional support and to 
strengthen local governance capacity in a context where there is a ‘to-
tal absence of a territorial state’.23 Institutional support undertaken by 
Civil Affairs involves a range of activities, such as training officials 
on the local and departmental levels, often bringing in experts from 
PaP. Trainings to date have involved, inter alia, activity planning, de-
veloping a budget, organization and administration such as setting up 
an organigramme, maintaining records and formal archives. Institu-
tional support also frequently involves support through QIPs, dis-
cussed in a later section. 
 
CA has been instrumental in pushing for a Public Administration Law 
to ensure the sustainability of current achievements. However, such a 
law has not yet been passed, which poses a serious threat to CA work 
in strengthening the local-level governance framework. Among the 
achievements mentioned by our CA interlocutors was changing the 
position of municipal accountant, a mandatory post in the municipal 
structure, from being a political position to that of a public servant. 
This has strengthened the possibilities for improved accountability of 
municipal funds and spending, also making the post less exposed to 
political control and patronage. Our interlocutors also explained that 
they were working to convert the financial controller post into a public 
servant, and a long-term goal was to support the adoption of a law 
whereby all municipal staff would be civil servants.  
                                                 
23  Interview with senior CAO. 
26 Diana Felix da Costa and John Karlsrud 
 
The absence of a law securing technical posts in the local administra-
tions means that the advances made through institutional support are 
in jeopardy. In the local elections, scheduled for March 2012,24 there 
is a risk that the existing administration of the country may find itself 
replaced, as all the posts in the local administration may be changed 
by the newly elected officials. According to one CAO, ‘civil affairs is 
gambling on the fact that any future legal framework will have to ac-
commodate the financial, administrative and budgetary management 
systems that have already been put in place in the municipalities over 
the last five years.’25 
Capacity development – early peacebuilding or lost in  
translation? 
During our visit, the government and MINUSTAH were conducting a 
fact-finding study that would hold the mayors accountable for their 
activities over the past five years – the Bilan Communale – ahead of 
the local elections scheduled for March 2012. CAOs visited all the 
municipalities, shared a letter from the MICT tasking the municipali-
ties to undertake the exercise, helped them conduct an inventory of 
activities, and finally organized a joint meeting of the mayors in the 
department, where they shared their achievements. It was hoped that 
this exercise would enable the local officials as well as the central 
government and the international community to establish a baseline of 
the development situation in Haiti. Yet it also leads to questions of 
what role CA should have – a de facto link between the central minis-
try and local authorities?  
 
One of the core tasks of CAOs is, a noted, feeding local voices into 
national policy processes. Civil affairs can help local officials in 
communicating their needs to central authorities, and officers often 
underscored the importance of their presence throughout the country, 
enabling them to feel the pulse of the country and provide updated in-
formation to headquarters: ‘That’s our strength: we are present every-
where. We can feel the temperature on the ground.’26 Civil affairs are 
effectively the ‘eyes and ears of the mission’, with their widespread 
presence throughout the territory and in close contact with local ac-
tors, albeit admittedly only a selection of them. CA reporting falls into 
roughly two categories: descriptive day-to-day reporting, and analyti-
cal pieces offering ‘local reactions to events’.  
CAOs are often confronted with cases where local authorities want 
their help in sorting out a problem, e.g. relating to communication 
with authorities at departmental or national levels. During our visit we 
                                                 
24  At the time of printing this report, the local elections had yet not been held. 
25  Former CAO, MINUSTAH. 
26  Interview with CAO. 
UN local peacebuilding and transition in Haiti   27 
 
27 
saw frequent examples of how civil affairs acted as a messenger be-
tween the various levels of governance. One instance concerned the 
letter for the Bilan Communale that had been sent out to all municipal-
ities, instructing the local officials to record achievements and chal-
lenges during the past three years. In most cases, it turned out that the 
letter had never been received by the local authorities. To further the 
process and gather the information, the teams we accompanied had a 
copy of the letter that they presented, explaining  what further actions 
were required in order to execute the instructions. This required pains-
taking work in filling out forms and trying to identify and record the 
activities of the local authorities. Interestingly, achievements were 
generally identified as involving the refurbishing of municipal offices, 
police station and other public buildings. The processes of local-level 
capacity development often became a kind of ‘hand-holding’ aimed at 
guiding local officials through the necessary steps to conform with 
bureaucratic procedures. As one respondent said: 
 
The only ISP [Institutional Support Programme] we can do, I don’t call it ISP, I 
call it accompagnement.27 We gather information on what the problems are, but 
we don’t develop capacity. That is because we don’t have a strategic plan. There 
is no impact in terms of building the capacity of the municipalities. The time that 
the CA staff has for building capacity for each of the municipalities is very lit-
tle… [we are] short-staffed and over-worked.28 
 
Another challenge identified in the example above and frequently not-
ed elsewhere was that CAOs tended to sort out issues directly, rather 
than taking the time to help local authorities to sort them out them-
selves, thus substituting for the local authorities and acting as a ‘state 
within the state’, an expression used by one CA national professional 
officer (NPO).29  
 
Some officers expressed frustration with what they perceived as a ten-
sion between the mandate to support institutional capacity develop-
ment to strengthen governance capacity on the local level, essentially 
a long-term task, and the short-term mandates of peacekeeping opera-
tions. In general, CAOs felt that there was a tension between the rather 
large task of developing real capacity and the very limited time at their 
disposal, when divided among the many municipalities and local gov-
ernment officials they were responding to and had in their mandated 
area. Some even felt that institutional support and capacity develop-
ment should be the responsibility of UNDP, not MINUSTAH:   
 
The problem with the mandate is that it is short-term, while ISP is long-term ca-
pacity building. There is a difference between support and capacity development. 
                                                 
27  The term used in French was ‘accompagnement’, which has a more encompassing sense 
than when used in English. 
28  Interview with CAO. 
29  Conversation with MINUSTAH national CA officer. 
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UNDP should be responsible for this, it is in their mandate. The office here is 
covering 13 municipalities. It is not the mandate of the mission to work on long-
term ISP, it is UNDP who should work on this, they have the mandate and 
knowledge, and civil affairs should support.30 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, peacekeepers have in recent years 
been recognized for the contribution they can make to stabilization 
and function as early peacebuilders.31 During our visit to Haiti it was 
clear that while CA may be present on the ground and able to 
strengthen the capacities of local officials, they are overburdened with 
tasks, making it very difficult to have a sustained and patient ap-
proach. Also deeply problematic is the lack of a legal framework that 
can guarantee the progress made. In consequence, some CAOs would 
like to hand over the institutional support role to UNDP and other 
long-term actors. But UNDP is hardly present in the field, so CA 
stands out as the only actor that realistically can make a contribution 
in this task, which they are in fact mandated and tasked to execute. On 
the other hand, more collaboration could be envisaged, to ensure that 
the rest of the UN as a whole supports the work for legislative reform 
in this area. 
 
Many different issues thus arise from the CA focus on institutional 
support in Haiti. In a later section we examine these, asking how the 
UN at large is working together to strengthen the capacity of the Hai-
tian government to provide security and deliver basic services at the 
local level.  
 
Recommendations 
- Member states, MINUSTAH and other actors should continue to press 
for legal reforms establishing a viable framework for support to decen-
tralization and local government, institutionalizing and securing the pro-
gress made to date;  
- Notwithstanding the absence of a legal framework, MINUSTAH and the 
rest of the UN system should continue their important work on capacity 
development for local government officials along the lines of the train-
ing given to municipal accountants; 
- Future legal reform will need to tackle, inter alia, the difficult questions 
of possible duplicative structures on local levels.  
3. QIPs and programme activities    
QIPs should primarily be a tool for ‘promoting acceptance for the 
mandated tasks’ of the mission and building support for the peace 
process by ‘demonstrating early dividends of stability to the popula-
tion’ – and they are funded by UN member states on that assump-
                                                 
30  Interview with CAO. 
31  UNSC 2010, As Security Council Weighs Measures.  
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tion.32 However, there is some scope for interpretation of the policy 
directive, and some member states would like to see QIPs used for 
early peacebuilding activities.33 Depending on the interpretation of the 
guidelines, the use of QIPs thus varies quite significantly from mis-
sion to mission, as we noted during our field research in Haiti, Liberia 
and South Sudan.  
 
Civil affairs officers spend a large amount of their time on implement-
ing QIPs, which are expected to be short-duration projects that should 
make a visible contribution by the mission to the local communities of 
Haiti. QIPs should thus be confidence-building tools, to help ac-
ceptance of the mission but also to address more immediate needs of 
the population. For the most part, QIPs are used for small infrastruc-
ture projects, such as setting up buildings for local officials or in con-
junction with the Justice Section, building or improving local courts, 
rehabilitation of water and sanitation, and other similar projects. QIPs 
are very broad, and are often used in support of the work of other sec-
tions of the mission, for instance by refurbishing court houses or giv-
ing various forms of training. Before the earthquake and cholera out-
break, MINUSTAH was the only organization present in many areas 
and departments, and it received hundreds of QIP requests.34  
 
According to our respondents, QIPs in Haiti fund: 1) public service 
and public infrastructure projects (schools, water & sanitation, etc.); 2) 
training and capacity-building and awareness-raising; and 3) liveli-
hoods and employment generation. The maximum amount for a single 
QIP in Haiti was raised from the regular $25,000 to $100,000 after the 
2010 earthquake. Previously, the ceiling had been $25,000 per project, 
with a total annual budget of $3 million in 2004, increasing to $5 mil-
lion prior to the earthquake. After the 2010 earthquake, the total budg-
et was increased significantly, and for 2011 the budget stood at $7.5 
million. In addition to the funds for QIPs, MINUSTAH has a commu-
nity violence reduction (CVR) unit mandated to implement activities 
in the ‘yellow’ and ‘red’ zones with a budget of $9 million. The CVR 
unit evolved from a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) programme, and targets specific areas of the country where 
there had been gang violence. The aim has been to engage with gangs 
that had been instrumentalized by politicians and/or the private sector. 
Operating in ‘yellow’ and ‘red’ zones – zones marked by violence and 
still considered unsafe – the CVR unit can implement projects much 
                                                 
32  UN (2007), DPKO Policy Directive: Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). Available at: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/Multidimensional%20and%20Integrat
ed/Quick%20Impact%20Guidelines.pdf, accessed 16 January 2012: p. 3. 
33  Interview with DPKO Best Practices official. 
34  Interview with CAO. 
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more easily than under normal UN procedures, thereby avoiding con-
siderable red tape.35 
 
Some of our respondents noted that the quality of QIPs had improved 
with the increased budget ceiling:  
 
QIPs are used to set up basic structures at local level. Before they were more 
used to improve the image of MINUSTAH. Now the QIPs are bigger, more stra-
tegic and to set up basic infrastructure that can strengthen local authorities and 
the services they should provide.36 
 
There were differing views within the mission as to what purpose 
QIPs should have, with some arguing for income-generating projects 
that can improve the lives of the population and offer some concrete 
peace dividends. The MINUSTAH QIPs differ from the types of pro-
jects that more long-term development actors such as UNDP are im-
plementing, in terms of duration, scope and the skills of the staff in-
volved. However, although QIPs are short-duration projects they re-
quire relatively large amounts of manpower for administrative purpos-
es:  
 
QIPs [are used] as confidence-building mechanisms to build good rapport. If we 
consider the amount of work that goes with QIPs, it’s a lot of time! There are 
specific procedures that need to be followed in the QIPs. If you receive a QIP re-
quest, first we visit the site and verify location and proposed project which leads 
to decision on the QIP. When a QIP is launched, it has to be monitored, check 
how implementation is going, progress reports, etc.37 
 
In addition, the final cost of QIPs has to include human resources that 
are not usually accounted for.  One respondent informed us, ‘There 
are weeks when all people do is work on QIPs’.38 
 
On the one hand, it is fair to say that QIPs are making a certain impact 
–  in terms of the projects that are developed and in terms of some ca-
pacity development. On the other hand, QIPs have become central el-
ements in the work of CAOs, due to their time-consuming element 
and high visibility. There are signs that many officers have appropri-
ated the logic of their counterparts or assimilated with them – focusing 
on the material support that MINUSTAH is able to contribute with 
through QIPs. When talking with CAOs, we noted that they almost as 
frequently counted their achievements in terms of buildings, infra-
structure, even establishing archives or organigrammes as the local 
authorities do. While such things are important to local authorities, 
they are also only the external features of a bureaucracy and cannot 
                                                 
35  Interview with senior MINUSTAH official. 
36  Interview with CAO. 
37  Interview with senior CAO. 
38  Interview with senior CAO. 
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indicate how the authorities are performing in their key role of deliv-
ering basic services to their constituency, the local population. This 
focus on material support may be due simply to the limited number of 
respondents in this study, or the limited time that the research team 
spent on the ground, but it should still give some pause for thought.  
 
Discussing the potential of QIPs, civil affairs officers argued that 
MINUSTAH had a lot of manpower but relatively little funding com-
pared with UNDP and development actors. UNDP officials asserted 
that there was no real transfer or development of capacity by the inter-
ventions of MINUSTAH CAOs.39 Others argued that the QIPs were 
relatively highly labour-intensive activities that did not yield satisfac-
tory returns on the investment, with the pejorative SNIPS – ‘slow no 
impact projects’ – attached to them.40 It was argued that CAOs lacked 
the programme culture needed to harness the potential in the funding 
available and the presence throughout the country.41 Another criticism 
from within MINUSTAH was that most QIPs were signed in June, at 
the end of the budget cycle with the same implementing partners42 – 
they were in other words blueprint solutions signed in order to be able 
to spend the budget, without considering the real needs on the ground.  
 
A recurring challenge identified was the tension between the desire to 
see tangible dividends emerging from the MINUSTAH presence and 
support, and the desire to strengthen the governance capacity of local 
authorities. Simply put: QIPs are far more popular than support to ca-
pacity development, as they can deliver tangible results to the local 
authorities. Building vertical structures and developing capacity are 
complementary activities for strengthening the capacity of local au-
thorities, who need both office premises and skills. But in our view 
there was too much focus on the tangible outputs and not enough on 
strengthening capacity and the legal framework to protect these in-
vestments.  
 
With the guidance given by the Secretary-General and the policy di-
rective on early peacebuilding, there should be ample room for UN 
peacekeeping missions to direct some QIP funding towards capacity-
development initiatives, like the training for accountants. This also 
reverberates with the recent UN report on civilian capacities,43 as well 
as the  advice given by a group led by the former head of UN peace-
keeping, Jean-Marie Guéhenno.44 The Guéhenno Report underscored 
                                                 
39  Group interview with UNDP officials. 
40  Interview with MINUSTAH official. 
41  Ibid. 
42  Ibid. 
43  UNSG (2011). Civilian Capacity in the aftermath of Conflict, S/2011/527 (19 August 
2011). 
44  Jean-Marie Guéhenno (ed.). (2011), Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict Inde-
pendent report of the Senior Advisory Group. A/65/747, S/2011/85 (22 February 2011).  
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the potential for UN peacekeeping to contribute to early peacebuilding 
using part of their budget for programme activities,45 and the SG fol-
low-up report used the CVR initiative of MINUSTAH as an example 
of such activities,46 advising that ‘[i]n some cases, due to its presence 
and capacities, the mission can and should initiate an activity for a 
mandated function for which the voluntary funds are not available or 
have not yet been mobilized.’47  
 
The institutional support programme seems to be one of these cases 
where the UN mission and CA have a comparative advantage both 
geographically and historically, and could use mission funds to 
strengthen the support to institutional capacity development on the 
local and departmental levels. This should, of course, be done in close 
consultation with the host government, other UN agencies, funds and 
programmes as well as other development actors and civil society. 
QIP funding should be considered as part of the resource envelope 
available for support to key objectives and mandated tasks, including 
programme activities.   
 
Recommendations 
- MINUSTAH should, with reference to the policy directive on QIPs and 
the SG report on civilian capacities, consider using more funds for ca-
pacity-development activities for local officials, in close collaboration 
with the MICT, civil society, UNDP and other relevant stakeholders; 
- QIPs are very time-consuming, so there should be a focus on pooling 
similar QIPs in order to lower transaction costs;  
- Staff should be trained in development programming, and a closer part-
nership with UNDP and other development agencies should be fostered, 
especially as these actors are currently co-located in PaP. 
4. Local ownership and engaging with non-state actors 
Ownership over mission work 
How are the priorities and the activities of the UN mission estab-
lished? How much reflection goes into planning and taking time to 
reflect on where the section is going, and what its successes have 
been? Who are the local actors? How are they identified? What and 
whose ownership are we discussing – national, local level? govern-
ment, civil society, the general population? These are important ques-
tions that may benefit from further reflection. 
 
Broadly, there are several characteristics of the mission in Haiti 
unique to its context. Indeed, some staff members referred to 
                                                 
45  Ibid. 
46  UNSG, Civilian Capacity: pp. 17–18. 
47  Ibid, p. 18. 
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MINUSTAH as a mission testing ground. MINUSTAH comes across 
as a tailor-made mission with various sections intended to respond to 
the specific needs of the country, such as the Humanitarian and De-
velopment Coordination Section, the Community Violence Reduction 
Section, and the Rule of Law Coordination Section.  
 
In a weak state like Haiti, where the government relies heavily on 
MINUSTAH and NGOs for service delivery and provision of security, 
the close support may even weaken the government further, making it 
dependent on external interveners for planning activities and their 
funding. However, some of our interlocutors also argued that ‘local 
ownership is a question of guts, of locals asking for it.’48 This should 
be of great concern for the mission. There is today a renewed focus on 
local ownership, and countries that have experience conflict and fra-
gility have joined forces in the g7+ initiative to demand for greater 
attention to their needs, strengthening national and local capacities and 
giving support through national budgets.49  
 
All CAOs that we spoke with emphasized the importance and primacy 
of local ownership in their work, as well as the challenges involved in 
having local counterparts claim real ownership:  
 
If you want efficiency, then substitute and do it yourself. If you want develop-
ment and change, then it takes time. More and more, Haitians who have been as-
sisted for too long want to take responsibility for their own things.  
 
Other understandings among our interlocutors of what local ownership 
entails ranged from ‘not taking the lead in the process’, and instead 
‘creating the framework for nationals to do the job’, ‘building on ex-
isting expertise, through coaching and training… so that beneficiaries 
see themselves as drivers of the process’.  
 
Most CAOs were of the opinion that their colleagues in the section 
generally shared their views and understandings of the term and 
‘know they shouldn’t occupy the driver’s seat’, although this was not 
as easily said as done. One officer told us that local ownership was 
always on her mind during her work, but added that it was ‘difficult to 
talk of local ownership and doesn’t make much sense’ as ‘they [local 
authorities] do their own work. They’re managing their communes. 
It’s difficult enough not to be perceived as controllers, people coming 
to see what they’re doing, spies.’50 In her view, CA work in Haiti was 
similar to that of human rights officers with a large dimension of mon-
                                                 
48  Interview with senior CAO, MINUSTAH. 
49  g7+ (2010) The Dili Declaration: A New Vision for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. 
Paris, International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, OECD. The g7+ is an 
open group of countries and regions experiencing conflict and fragility, now consisting of 
19 countries.  
50  Interview with CAO. 
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itoring and reporting which meant it was difficult to speak of truly lo-
cal ownership.  
Engaging with local actors 
Many developing countries, particularly those that fall into the ‘fragile 
states’ category, depend considerably on non-state actors (or non-state 
providers, NSPs) for basic services to parts of their populations, typi-
cally the most vulnerable. According to the World Bank, NSPs have 
also been found to be more responsive to markets and to offer better 
quality and more competitive, cost-effective services than the state, 
and are often less vulnerable than the public sector to political change 
and conflict.51 In Haiti, there is a very diverse non-state sector with 
operators ranging from community-based organizations (CBOs), na-
tional and international NGOs, faith-based organizations, private 
companies, small-scale informal providers, and individual practition-
ers. This diversity makes regulation, coordination, and quality assur-
ance challenging. It also gives rise to questions about the equity and 
quality of service provision, with repercussions for individual con-
sumers and the collective welfare of the country as a whole. Unsur-
prisingly, donor-assisted NSPs risk creating parallel structures and 
thereby contributing to undermine already weak government struc-
tures. The World Bank concludes that these concerns suggest that the 
state has an important role in service provision at some level. Yet giv-
en state fragility and general limited lack of resources and capacity, 
governments may be better placed for facilitating and coordinating 
than for engaging in direct provision.52 
 
Much of this report has focused on the relationship of CA to the gov-
ernment, and the local authorities in particular, because this consti-
tutes the bulk of MINUSTAH’s CA work in Haiti. Especially as re-
gards the legitimacy of many local authorities vis-à-vis their constitu-
encies, this gives rise to the question of who the ‘locals’ are and whom 
CA should work with. Certainly, ‘local actors’ involve more than local 
authorities who may be regarded as corrupt and morally questionable, 
or simply absent. 
 
It was suggested that the mission ‘[had not given] adequate considera-
tion to the role of non-state actors in institutional building’,53 when 
crafting and pursuing its local government assistance strategy. 
MINUSTAH argued that its focus on state authorities was motivated 
by the danger of ceding too much responsibility to non-state actors, 
which could end up weakening even further the same state they were 
trying to building. In the opinion of one former CRO, ‘…such an ar-
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52  Ibid. 
53  Interview with CAO. 
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gument can be tenable at face value, [yet] it fails to aggregate the gap-
filling role of non-state institutions.’54  
 
Certainly, the UN, and the DPKO in particular, are known for having 
the government as the prime partner. The CA section recognized its 
support had focused mostly on local authorities, and that it was neces-
sary to extend this to civil society organizations (CSOs) as well. CA 
has established some good practices, succeeding in bringing together 
all parts of society. In the period of the early 2011 second round of 
elections, the electoral forums, also known as ‘town hall meetings’, 
brought together representatives of civil society, local media, local 
authorities, including mayors, judges of peace, Haitian National Police 
officers, CASEC, ASEC, as well as candidates or representatives, rep-
resentatives of political parties, and MINUSTAH representatives. 
During this period, CA organized 120 forums throughout all the 
communes in the country.55 In one focus-group discussion with CAOs 
it was said:  
 
It was important to get the voices of all the people, and gave the opportunity of 
people to vent their frustrations. MINUSTAH made an assessment of their role 
in the first round [of elections], and concluded that they were too passive. So it 
took a more assertive and active role in the second round, including arranging 
town hall meetings together with local authorities. This was done together with 
mayors. Sometimes we had to tell them who they should invite, including civil 
society, key actors.56 
 
These were generally regarded as a significant success. When ques-
tioned whether the ‘town hall’ model could be applicable also beyond 
elections, CAOs in this focus group discussion suggested they ‘could 
be useful in the development of municipal plans and in the budget ex-
ercise.’57 Thus,  the town hall meeting might be one possible mecha-
nism for including more stakeholders in the planning and decision 
process and generating greater ownership among them. 
 
 
We were informed that when deciding priorities and programming 
some CA teams had tried to include both local institutional and non-
institutional actors, and had:  
 
…developed and successfully experimented with the concept of what [he] called 
‘affirmative local governance’, which is an institutional development model 
based on the principles of empowered participatory governance. The hallmarks 
of affirmative local governance are the building of synergies and symbiotic 
grassroots compacts between local governments and civil society organizations 
for improved service delivery.58 
                                                 
54  Ibid. 
55  Interview with CAO. 
56  Focus-group discussion CAOs.  
57  Ibid. 
58  Former MINUSTAH civil affairs. 
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In our discussions, most local authorities praised the civil affairs ap-
proach in developing QIPs, and said that QIPs were generally based 
on local requests and perceived needs. According to the mayors we 
met, this contrasted sharply with the approach taken by most NGOs as 
well as some UN development agencies. The latter were largely seen 
as operating independently of the local authorities and the local devel-
opment plan. It thus seems that CA was here seen as a more legitimate 
actor, at least from the perspective of the local officials – although 
these may not be representative of all the various population groups 
and interests. 
 
In terms of external challenges, apart from the already-noted absence 
of clear national government policy guidelines, the ‘lack of credible 
national interlocutors to work with’ and ‘lack of political will’ re-
mained the greatest challenges, according to one CAO.59 Where polit-
ical will existed, there would be often a sense of general breakdown 
between local authorities and the MICT, and local authorities would 
then relay requests through civil affairs, hoping they would be able to 
get the message through. However, also CA would often struggle 
here, and that would weaken their relationship vis-à-vis the local au-
thorities. Civil affairs can thus be regarded as one of several potential 
entry points for solving problems.  
 
Doubts were raised as to whether the local authorities were in fact in-
terested in receiving support: ‘Here it is very different – we are man-
dated to assist and advise. It depends on them [local authorities] 
whether they wanted to be assisted. If they don’t, it is very difficult.’60 
For many reasons, some local authorities were reluctant to receive in-
stitutional support from CA. Interestingly, civil affairs officers argued 
that they could get around this obstacle by employing QIPs as a carrot:  
 
  …fortunately, there are sufficient partners around who want to work with us. I 
don’t need to force others to work with us. We also have a good carrot – the 
QIPs. In Haiti there are a lot of these. In order to get the ‘difficult’ group on 
board we use QIPs.61 
 
Reporting remains a central and time-consuming task for CAOs. De-
scriptive as well as analytical reporting are valuable sources of infor-
mation for decision-makers at HQ and in New York, and the roughly 
100 CAOs throughout Haiti provide the mission with a fine web of 
listening posts, essential for getting a sense of general attitudes to-
wards the UN mission, political developments and the needs of the 
local population. However, to implement their mandate, CAOs need to 
                                                 
59  Ibid. 
60  Interview with senior CAO. 
61  Interview with senior CAO, MINUSTAH. Quotations marks inserted by authors. 
UN local peacebuilding and transition in Haiti   37 
 
37 
be more than listening posts: they must also be able to empower civil 
society groups and other non-state actors to have their voice heard. 
 
In general, CA engaged predominantly with local authority counter-
parts more than with non-state actors. Good cooperation with local 
authorities often hinged on the presence of a mayor who would have a 
plan for development for that local community.62 It was acknowledged 
that often the involvement with local actors would not run deep 
enough – CA would relay the challenges met by local authorities, and 
‘not the main challenges of the communities as such’.63 Among CSOs 
a similar problem of representation was widespread. Civil society 
would claim to be representative of the local communities and various 
causes, but perceived by civil affairs to be set up merely to respond to 
the availability of QIP and other funding. A mapping of CSOs in one 
region indicated that there were many organizations, but these were 
very small and recently established. Such organizations in rural areas 
were seen as less supply-driven than those in urban areas, and the 
churches were also seen as heading initiatives that would be more rep-
resentative.64 Some of our CA interlocutors also felt it more important 
to engage with political parties on the local level than with CSOs. An-
other challenge would be to get a real sense of what the needs of the 
local communities actually are, as articulated by local CSOs, as inter-
locutors would be have a difficulty in articulating their needs and and 
say that if they could have more funding they could do more things.  
 
The presence of supply-driven CSOs responding to the availability of 
funding rather than the needs and interests of local communities is a 
common challenge facing aid and development actors in most post-
conflict settings. Even though legitimate civil society actors may be 
few and far between, not engaging with civil society should not be 
considered an option.   
 
The research team also noted that local actors tended not to think of 
themselves as protagonists in a peacebuilding effort, although they are 
central in such an undertaking. Politics was seen as continuing as usu-
al, and ‘the mission was seen to be protecting a power set and not fa-
cilitating a national dialogue’.65 In part, this was due to lack of aware-
ness on the part of the mission and other international actors as to the 
role they might be able to play in enabling non-state actors outside of 
PaP to have a voice. This should be a focus area for the UN and other 
actors when they start on the transition process of phasing out the mis-
sion. 
 
                                                 
62  Interview with CAO. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Ibid. 
65  Ibid. 
38 Diana Felix da Costa and John Karlsrud 
The challenges facing CA when engaging with civil society and other 
local actors are many and complex. Some common threads are the 
pervasive lack of capacity, supply-driven orientation of activities, lack 
of broad engagement with non-state actors, and lack of ownership 
among the communities of local CSOs and their activities. Civil af-
fairs can and should do better in channelling local voices into national 
policy processes. We acknowledge that this is a tall order, but as they 
are the ones who are present across Haiti, and with a mandate for ena-
bling local voices to be heard in the national processes, this should be 
a key item on the agenda forward. This will means a broader and more 
systematic engagement with civil society, the churches and other local 
actors. Greater effort should also be put into strengthening the capaci-
ty of local actors to contribute to policy-making processes on the local 
and national levels.  
 
5. The UN and local-level peacebuilding in Haiti 
Coordination, reporting and cross-mission representation 
Civil Affairs Officers in the field are expected to spend a minimum of 
two days a week visiting municipalities, identifying management gaps 
and working with municipal cadres to find solutions to their everyday 
problems. Depending on the field offices, CA teams (of two officers 
working together) have responsibility for an average of ten municipal-
ities each, and try to visit two to four municipalities per week.66 Pro-
gress, or lack of it, is measured every three months via a comprehen-
sive dashboard system .  
 
                                                 
66  Group interview with MINUSTAH CAOs. 
Recommendations 
- While Civil Affairs is recognized by local authorities as the ‘best 
in class’ in terms of listening to local needs, there is a need for fur-
ther strengthening the participatory approach, e.g. through town 
hall meetings to ensure that also other voices are heard and can 
participate in national decision-making processes 
- Given its core mandate of feeding local voices into national policy 
processes, CA should make more sustained efforts at engaging 
with and strengthening the capacity of a broader representation of 
local actors, including various SCOs and the churches 
- Recalling the g7+ declaration, there is a need to pay more attention 
to national planning frameworks and needs, on the national, de-
partmental and local levels, for instance by supporting the table de 
concertation and the rule-of-law clusters as decision-making fo-
rums for all peacebuilding and development actors.    
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There are internal and external challenges in accomplishing these ob-
jectives. The frequency of visits varies widely, often depending on 
practical accessibility rather than the perceived needs of the particular 
municipality. Municipalities located furthest away were generally vis-
ited about once a month at best,67 while those more proximate to the 
CA office would be visited more frequently. However, our interlocu-
tors informed us that mayors and other officials would make frequent 
visits to the urban centres to meet with department delegates, and in 
conjunction with these visits they would also meet with CAOs to fol-
low up on QIPs and other pending issues.  
 
Coordination, reporting and cross-mission representation are extreme-
ly time-consuming elements of the CAO work-day. It was argued that 
these tasks often could draw away the attention from what was con-
sidered the core task of Civil Affairs: to strengthen institutional capac-
ity.68 
 
Weekly coordination meetings in the regions are led by the senior 
CAO who is also the regional coordinator of the mission. Other coor-
dination meetings are held at regular intervals for thematic sub-cluster 
such as the rule-of-law cluster, and externally with local official coun-
terparts. The latter are important for ensuring open flows of communi-
cation and keeping an ‘ear to the ground’ – knowing the needs of local 
officials and being able to respond swiftly to these.  
 
However, it was argued that responsibility for coordination of the UN 
system should be located with UNDP, as on the national level.69 This 
is not possible, nor will it be, as UNDP is present in only a few of the 
ten regions.70 However, one possible way to mediate the lack of pres-
ence by UNDP and other UN funds, programmes and agencies would 
be to have a stronger link between CA and the UN Country Team. A 
first attempt has been made here, by transferring responsibility for the 
Civil Affairs Section to the Deputy SRSG for Development – the UN 
resident coordinator. However, so far it seems as if this move has been 
reflected only in a formal sense and in the Integrated Strategic 
Framework (ISF), but not – most importantly – in actual practice in 
the field.  
‘Firefighters’ or building capacity – civil affairs as early peace-
builders? 
UN peacekeeping missions have evolved considerably over the past 
twenty years, and are today providing substantial support through ci-
vilian officers in many sectors, including civil affairs, justice, security 
                                                 
67  Interview with CAO. 
68  Interview with senior MINUSTAH. 
69  Interview with CAO. 
70  Group interview with UNDP officials. 
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sector reform, corrections, human rights and gender. As the UN Secre-
tary-General pointed out in 2009, the civilian capacities of peacekeep-
ing missions are ‘early peacebuilders’ and are key providers of sup-
port to core government capacities, at the national as well as the local 
level. UN DPKO civil affairs officers (CAOs) are key nodal points in 
this endeavour. Although largely unknown, CAOs account for about 
870 staff71 in peace operations around the world today. Their man-
dates range from conflict management and support to reconciliation, 
to extension of state authority and cross-mission representation and 
coordination. This arrangement is both flexible and far-reaching, al-
lowing for contextualization to local specificities. On the other hand, 
broad mandates can also prove problematic, with CA expected to be 
involved in each and every issue, risking a loss of focus on core tasks.  
 
CAOs often referred to themselves as ‘firefighters’ – with many man-
dated tasks, wide geographical responsibility for a number of munici-
palities, and new challenges constantly arising, it could be hard to fo-
cus on strategic-level work: ‘We do crisis management, we are fire-
fighters and do it every day, nothing structural.’72 Both local authori-
ties and MINUSTAH headquarters are constant sources of new more 
or less important tasks that must be done, with short deadlines. As civ-
il affairs represent the political affairs section in the regions, they of-
ten have to prepare political analyses and profiles of key figures and 
issues at short notice for mission headquarters and UN DPKO in New 
York. Similarly, the local authorities will have a host of issues of 
varying importance that need to be dealt with at short notice, be it 
waste management, crowd control and managing possible epidemics 
like the cholera outbreak in 2010.  
 
The UN should seriously consider a rearrangement of the coordination 
arrangements on the departmental and local levels in Haiti. In South 
Sudan, during the time of UNMIS, Resident Coordinator Support Of-
ficer posts were established to manage the work related to humanitari-
an and development tasks, funded over the regular peacekeeping mis-
sion budget. Under UNMISS, these have now been converted into Re-
covery, Reintegration and Peacebuilding posts, responsible for coor-
dinating these activities and enabling the UN presences to serve as  
‘portal and platform’ for other UN agencies, funds and programmes, 
as well as NGOs and bilateral partners.73 Haiti is in many ways a very 
different setting – but a similar arrangement should be considered to 
ensure better cooperation and the delivery of programme activities on 
departmental and local levels, as well as a better transition and future 
exit of the peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping has traditionally re-
                                                 
71  Including professional national and international officers and UN Volunteers. UN 2012. 
Civil Affairs Staffing January 2012. UN DPKO, New York. 
72  Interview with CAO. 
73  Interview with SRSG Hilde Johnson, Juba. 
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volved around short-term objectives, and thus lacks a culture for long-
term capacity development among civil affairs and other MINUSTAH 
officers. There could be a tendency among peacekeepers in general, 
and perhaps civil affairs officers in particular, to resort automatically 
to QIPs and other short-term solutions such as accompagnement or 
hand-holding, in reacting to long-term challenges. When challenged 
on this point, respondents tended to explain this feature of peacekeep-
ing operations with the lack of a development culture – the ability to 
plan for long-term outcomes and impact through the use of program-
ming instead of short-term projects.  
 
While this argument might seem reasonable, on further inspection it 
does not hold up. There is a distinction to be made, firstly between 
capacity development and ‘accompanying’ local authorities, and sec-
ondly between knowing what the strengths and weaknesses of the lo-
cal authorities are and what should be done, without having the means 
to do so. This points to the next argument of this report – the need for 
real cooperation between peacekeepers and other more long-term ac-
tors.  
Challenges in UN coordination and integration 
MINUSTAH is an integrated mission. A strategic work-plan has been 
developed for the mission and the UN agencies involved. However, 
this does not translate into the individual planning of each section nor 
UNDP, as well as concretely at the local level. On the local level, in-
tegrated work-plans are non-existent and the UN seems to work in a 
disjointed manner. Each side blames the other for this lack of vision, 
integration and coordination. One of our interlocutors argued that 
 
It’s not MINUSTAH’s fault [for the lack of coordination]. There is a lot of reluc-
tance and resistance from agencies, who are scared of losing their space. CA 
tried to do integrated planning, and this should be mandatory. Supposedly this is 
an integrated mission, but not in planning... contrary to other missions I’ve been 
to, where there was one planning. Also we need stronger leadership, at the top of 
the mission to push to achieve integration. There is the UNDAF, with several pil-
lars and entities that need to work together, but there is no joint work-plan. We 
need to put together the resources UNDP has, along with its approaches and 
methodologies and technical knowledge, with CA officers on the ground. We 
need to be integrated.74 
 
As a notable exception, UNDP has been running a local governance 
support project in Haiti’s North-East Department for the last ten years, 
and several respondents confirmed that this had been implemented in 
                                                 
74  Interview with human rights officer. UNDP has two relevant resource envelopes – 1) 
Poverty, livelihoods and recovery with an annual budget of $30 million; and 2) govern-
ance and rule of law with $15 million per year. For more, see UNDP (2012), ‘Haïti: Re-
sources’. Available at 
http://www.ht.undp.org/public/ressources.php?PHPSESSID=78d077e0a107c37cdd2c82b
077e22ebb, accessed 13 January 2012. 
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close partnership with civil affairs – including co-financing of micro-
projects such as municipal buildings, peace tribunals, training in 
budget development, income-generation activities, and others. Aside 
from this project, however, there was little evidence of long-term col-
laboration between CA and other UN agencies on the local level. One 
of our interlocutors argued that UNDP should switch from being in a 
post-post-conflict to a post-conflict mode,75 indicating that UNDP 
may be overly risk-averse and not engaging adequately with early re-
covery programmes on the local level. 
 
The field presence of CAOs offers an excellent opportunity for joint 
programming of initiatives to support local governance. MINUSTAH 
and development actors within and outside the UN system should sit 
down and see how they can utilize the resource that CAOs could be 
for bottom–up peacebuilding in Haiti. For instance, CAOs might serve 
as case officers, following up on a joint local governance support pro-
ject covering all municipalities in Haiti.  
 
With added responsibilities, and a heavy workload already today, it is 
obvious that CA responsibilities would need a thorough revision to 
make possible such an initiative. More than 20% of the CAO time is 
today spent on developing, approving and following up QIPs.76 A 
large-scale initiative to support local governance should incorporate 
large parts of the existing QIPs and significantly decrease the time 
needed to follow up on individual projects. CAOs should be given au-
thority to access and spend project funds through UNDP’s Atlas sys-
tem, where there are open contracts on office material, furniture and 
other small costs that today are run as individual QIPs in CA support 
to municipalities.77 
 
Agencies and peacekeeping missions are not famed for working col-
laboratively. The UNDP has been in Haiti for much longer than 
MINUSTAH, and there is inevitably a sense of ownership over the 
work done. In addition comes the fact that UNDP has a long-term 
mandate, which in theory runs counter to the nature of peacekeeping 
missions. Yet, it might be possible to continue some of the civilian 
components of the peacekeeping operation also after the departure of 
the military components, as a special political mission. One of our in-
terlocutors suggested a 24-month transition window where assessed 
funding would be accessible for peacebuilding projects,78 and projects 
and programmes could be executed jointly by the civilian components 
                                                 
75  Interview with CAO. 
76  This is based on CA informing that there would be two QIPs focal points per department, 
plus four staff located in the QIPs unit at HQ. 
77  Atlas is UNDP’s software system for management and administration of all its projects, 
procurement, etc.  
78  Interview with senior MINUSTAH official. 
UN local peacebuilding and transition in Haiti   43 
 
43 
and UN development funds and programmes. In that case, there 
should be less reluctance (or fewer excuses) on the part of agencies to 
avoid working in line with peacekeeping missions. 
 
Achieving a more integrated approach will require a change in the cul-
ture of the organizations, moving from making joint plans such as the 
Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) to actual cooperation on nation-
al, regional and local levels. Most of our respondents in CA, UNDP 
and among those responsible for integration saw a real potential for 
more cooperation, acknowledging the comparative advantages that the 
mission and UNDP could bring to the table, but could not formulate 
how such cooperation could be put into motion. As suggested by one 
CAO, one way to ‘promote’/encourage the much needed collaboration 
between MINUSTAH and UNDP could be to touch on the financial 
resources, under the motto of: ‘if you want the money, then work to-
gether’. In the view of another senior interlocutor: 
 
The mission has to know when it should delegate to other specialized agencies. 
Trim wings of DPKO of what’s under their control, and this could actually rein-
force the position of the SRSG as he will not have to be constantly fighting for a 
place.79 
 
Joint conceptual planning should go hand in hand with financial plan-
ning. One senior-level MINUSTAH staff argued for greater coherence 
in resource allocation: ‘It should be possible to pool resources – have 
$9 million for CVR, $7,5 for QIPs, $3 for government support under 
the Security Council Resolution.’80 He also argued that MINUSTAH 
should collaborate more with agencies: ‘the SRSG has funds for 
WASH [Water, Sanitation and Hygiene], which could be pooled with 
the resources UNICEF has.’81 To better utilize these funds, a meeting 
of the top brass of the mission was called at the end of our stay to pool 
the mission’s resources for more strategized action. The SRSG wanted 
to see how QIPs, CVR funds, funds allocated through Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1927 and mission support funds could be used more 
coherently in Haiti.82 Through a consultation process with the CROs 
and the MICT, priority areas should be established, with ‘a blend of 
hardware and capacity development projects’.83 
 
CAOs recognize their own potential in coordination and their privi-
leged position in the field as the linkage between local communities 
and UN agencies and INGOs, but have not felt that others (internally 
and externally to MINUSTAH) were quite aware of that space-making 
role. Informal discussions with staff from other sections within 
                                                 
79  Interview with former senior MINUSTAH staff. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid. 
82  Ibid. 
83  Ibid. 
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MINUSTAH and NGOs revealed a surprising lack of familiarity with 
the work and potential of civil affairs. This may simply indicate de-
fensiveness on the part of other sections – but it may also mean that 
CA should be more assertive in making its space known, or may be 
indicative of the disconnect as to how the international community 
tends to operate in Haiti.   
 
One aspect that struck the research team were the frequent remarks 
and frustrations expressed by lower-level CAOs deployed in the field 
offices we visited, about the overall lack of direction and planning 
they sometimes felt in their work. This was touched on briefly in dis-
cussing ‘civil affairs as firefighters’; this short section will consider 
the need to take time for greater reflection. As one senior-level CA 
interlocutor argued:  
 
There is a need for more staff doing planning and monitoring in CA. At the mo-
ment there is too much firefighting and not enough prevention. A planning unit 
in CA should look at the mandate and how to put this into practice. CA could 
have planning officers that work with integration and also have other tasks.84 
 
According to this officer, ‘more than 90% of civil affairs senior staff 
have been in the mission for at least five years’. This has obvious ad-
vantages in terms of contextual knowledge and institutional memory 
of the socio-political environment. However, many of our interlocu-
tors felt that the CA MINUSTAH rotational policy which allows staff 
to be moved as the need arises, and which leads to staff movement and 
rotation roughly every two years, was counterproductive if staff, par-
ticularly management staff, are reassigned to different geographical 
areas simply to perform the same core duties. As noted by one, ‘such 
movements inevitably lead to humdrum drudgery and routine, that 
leaves little room for innovation. CA MINUSTAH seems to be suffer-
ing from operational lethargy due in part to the perenniality of its sen-
ior staff.’85  
 
Another challenge already mentioned is the lack of operationalization 
in transferring CA from the political to the development pillar. This 
could be due to lack of time for implementing the shift among the sen-
ior mission management, and we would strongly encourage the man-
agement to focus on this key task in order to show that this is to be a 
change not only in the written structure, but in practice as well.  
                                                 
84  Interview with senior CAO, PaP. 
85  Former MINUSTAH CAO.  
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Recommendations 
- The civil affairs workload should be trimmed, e.g. by limiting the 
use of QIPs  
- The UN should consider the model used in South Sudan, of in-
cluding posts with responsibility for programme activities and 
opening the field presences for other peacebuilding and develop-
ment actors  
- Strengthen planning for early peacebuilding among relevant staff 
in MINUSTAH, including CA through a joint planning exercise 
with the UN country team  
- Operationalize existing integration in planning frameworks such as 
the ISF into programme activities executed on local levels  
- Consider a 24-month transition window in the handover of pro-
gramme activities from MINUSTAH to the UN country team 
- Pool resources for programme activities by focusing QIPs on es-
sential tasks and by transferring funds to capacity-development in-
itiatives that can be initiated with reference to the SG guidance on 
civilian capacities  
- Devise a strategy together with UN DPKO New York on how to 
achieve staff mobility on senior levels.  
 
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
The promise of peacekeeping presences 
Through its Civil Affairs Officers (CAOs), MINUSTAH has an im-
pressive presence throughout Haiti, and is able to reach every single 
municipality in all the ten departments in the country. In their daily 
work, CAOs must strike a balance between being UN mission repre-
sentatives (including representing and undertaking tasks of other sec-
tions not present in the regions), strengthening the capacity of local 
authorities, helping local voices to be heard at headquarters level, and 
managing Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). According to most of our 
interlocutors among local officials, the work and approach of these 
CAOs is much appreciated. It was often contrasted with the approach 
of NGOs, who were seen as working independently from local author-
ities, often circumventing or ignoring the priorities of local officials. 
QIPs have become the main workstream for many CAOs, who are 
busy with planning, implementing and reporting on various small in-
frastructure projects. These are often highly appreciated by local offi-
cials, who are the main beneficiaries, getting new office premises and 
office equipment. However, the desire to present a positive image of 
MINUSTAH to the Haitian population should not lead to the tempta-
tion to implement a plethora of well-intentioned but not necessarily 
well-coordinated QIPs.  
 
With the resources that CA has at its disposal, one could argue that 
there could be a more structural and long-term approach to the support 
to local authorities. In developmental terms, 100 officers across the 
entire country is a sizable resource that could be put to better structur-
al use. For example, it makes little sense to establish a separate QIP 
for each municipal building to be refurbished or built from scratch in 
most of the municipalities of Haiti. This requires a great amount of 
staff time and paperwork with relatively little impact, and could be 
done more efficiently, freeing up staff time and resources to other ac-
tivities. Also the guidelines for QIPs in Haiti should be re-examined to 
ensure that funding is being used to maximum efficiency, to provide 
early dividends of stability to the population and create confidence in 
the local authorities by means of such activities as targeted capacity-
development initiatives.  
 
The training of municipal accountants was a positive example of ca-
pacity development frequently mentioned in discussions. This seemed 
to be a needs-based initiative that had, in cooperation with UNDP, es-
tablished lasting capacity in a structured manner in municipalities 
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throughout the country, without requiring too much staff time or re-
sources. Bearing in mind the recent SG report on civilian capacities 
and its recommendation for missions to use part of their budgets for 
programme activities, MINUSTAH should look for other such oppor-
tunities, in cooperation with local and national authorities, and imple-
ment them together with other development partners such as UNDP. 
The UN in turn should take one step back and see how it can leverage 
its presence in Haiti to deliver both short- and long-term assistance 
that can respond to the needs of local officials and populations:  ‘CA 
needs a vision on what to do in terms of capacity building. It is posi-
tive to have CA present throughout the territory, but these have to be 
better used by local authorities.’86 In a long-term perspective, the UN 
should consider how to handle the exit of the UN mission and the 
transfer of tasks from the mission to the UN country team. Greater 
collaboration on programme activities on the departmental and local 
levels could be an effective way of operationalizing the reshuffling of 
civil affairs to the development pillar, so as to get this important work 
underway.  
Working with non-state actors 
Civil Affairs in Haiti has an extremely difficult task, closely linked to 
the ability to contextualize its work. Formal state structures exist, but 
in reality there is very little capacity. The country lacks a culture of 
civil service and public service. The CA focus has been almost entire-
ly on local authorities. Although some successes have been achieved 
in this work with the formal authorities, CA could have taken a more 
inclusive approach, working to engage with civil society, conducting 
an analysis to identify who the non-state actors are, and building on 
informal groups in Haiti. Non-state actors, including CBOs, must be 
recognized as key partners when contextualized local peacebuilding 
activities are to be devised and implemented – particularly since these 
are so closely tied in with local governance and social organization. In 
view of the CA mandate,  greater efforts should be put into strength-
ening the capacity of local actors, including civil society, helping them 
to be heard also in Port-au-Prince. 
 
UN peacekeeping operations tend to cast the net wide and deep across 
the countries where they are deployed. While this can in theory pro-
vide the operation with a better overview of the situation in the coun-
try, the local populations and authorities will also expect more from 
these presences, in both the short and the longer term. Negative local-
level perceptions of the UN mission cannot be ignored. Such popular 
discontent must be addressed through serious reflection on the mis-
sion’s role, failures and successes since its establishment. Without 
close cooperation with development actors within and outside the UN, 
                                                 
86  Interview with former senior MINUSTAH staff. 
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the expectations of local populations cannot be met. The UN must 
take the challenges of the promise involved in its presences very seri-
ously, and give thorough consideration to how it can leverage the 
presence of its peacekeepers in the field to engage in more long-term 
development and capacity-developing activities. 
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